# CAIN42 — ARGUS Assurance Specification (Prompt 14)

The canonical objects, their fields, and their verification rules. All objects are canonicalizable, hashable,
signable, replayable and independently verifiable.

## 1. ArgusAssuranceObject (`CAIN42/ARGUS-ASSURANCE-OBJECT/v1`)

Fields: principal, agent, agent_lineage, model, model_version, runtime, skills, tools, memory_id,
memory_authority_state, policy_version, authorization_state, delegation_chain, authority_scope,
behavioral_envelope_digest, mission_envelope, environment_id, world_state_id, consequence_envelope,
effect_contracts, temporal_validity, evidence_requirements, evidence_freshness, evidence_independence,
current_execution_path, historical_execution_path, behavioral_deviation, capability_delta, authority_delta,
environment_delta, risk_delta, consequence_delta, verification_status, assurance_state, expiration, nonce,
revocation_state.

Derivation (deterministic):

```
REVOKED                       -> REVOKED
not temporal_valid            -> REAUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED
evidence_independence in      -> REAUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED
  {CORRELATED, INSUFFICIENT, UNKNOWN}
authority_delta in {MATERIAL, HIGH, CRITICAL} -> REAUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED
behavioral_deviation > anomaly_threshold      -> DRIFT_DETECTED
verification_status in {VERIFIED, PASSED}     -> VERIFIED
otherwise                     -> UNASSESSED
```

Verification rejects `assurance_state == VERIFIED` when revocation_state is REVOKED, deviation exceeds threshold,
or evidence independence is insufficient.

## 2. BehavioralAuthorityEnvelope (`CAIN42/ARGUS-BEHAVIORAL-AUTHORITY-ENVELOPE/v1`)

permitted_action_classes, permitted_tools, prohibited_tools, permitted_resource_classes, permitted_target_classes,
permitted_sequences, prohibited_transitions, max_delegation_depth, permitted_state_transitions, permitted_hours,
max_rate_per_minute, transaction_ranges, max_cumulative_amount, max_consequence, required_evidence,
required_approvals, anomaly_threshold, escalation_conditions, expiration.

`evaluate_envelope(envelope, path, ...)` returns COMPLIANT / VIOLATION / INDETERMINATE. An empty path is
INDETERMINATE (fail-closed). Depends on the **actual execution path**, never the model's explanation.

## 3. Execution path (`CAIN42/ARGUS-EXECUTION-PATH/v1`)

Each step is hash-chained: `H_k = sha256(H_{k-1} || canon({step_k}))`. Checkpoints record cumulative risk, amount,
consequence and authority consumption. `composition_verdict()` returns CONTINUE / RESTRICT / REAUTHORIZE / HALT when
the **composition** exceeds mission authority even though each step was individually permitted.

## 4. AutonomousAssuranceLease (`CAIN42/ARGUS-ASSURANCE-LEASE/v1`)

authority_scope, behavioral_scope_digest, mission_scope, environmental_assumptions, consequence_limit,
evidence_requirements, valid_from/valid_until, renewal_conditions, revocation_conditions,
reauthorization_triggers, issued_by/issuer_pub, lease_version, state, renewal_count. Renewal is refused when the
requester is the agent, the signer is not the authority issuer, fewer than two independent evidence roots exist, or
the evidence is stale.

## 5. AuthorityImpactSet

`{impact ∈ NONE/LOW/MATERIAL/HIGH/CRITICAL, action ∈ CONTINUE/CONTINUE_WITH_MONITORING/REAUTHORIZE/RESTRICT/HALT,
triggers, deltas, requires_evidence}`. Derived from the canonical trigger catalogue and explicit deltas.

## 6. Assurance Certificate (`CAIN42/ARGUS-ASSURANCE-CERTIFICATE/v1`)

Binds the assurance digest, assurance state, agent, lease digest, envelope digest, revocation state,
behavioral deviation/threshold, evidence independence, evidence roots, verifier verdict, issued_at, expires_at,
nonce, signature. The clean-room verifier (`cain-argus-verify/verify.py`) recomputes the verdict with zero CAIN
imports.

## 7. State machine

`UNASSESSED → VERIFIED ⇄ MONITORED → DRIFT_DETECTED → REAUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED → RECERTIFIED → VERIFIED`, with
`RESTRICTED`, `PAUSED`, `REVOKED`. There is no shortcut `DRIFT_DETECTED → VERIFIED` (fresh verification required)
and no `REVOKED → VERIFIED`/`RECERTIFIED` without a fresh external authorization event.
