# CAIN42 — ARGUS Security Model (Prompt 14)

## Trust boundaries

- The **agent** is untrusted to authorize; it may only propose and may never self-certify, self-renew, or expand its
  own authority.
- The **primary decision engine**, the **independent verifier**, the **evidence store** and the **execution
  enforcer** are separated; where possible they do not depend on the same mutable agent-controlled state.
- **Evidence** sources are untrusted individually; independence is computed structurally (distinct roots/groups),
  never assumed from a count.
- The **world model** and any **simulation** are untrusted to authorize; only fabric-verified state can.

## Threats and controls

| Threat | Control | Property |
|---|---|---|
| expired assurance | lease/certificate expiry; reauthorization on stale evidence | A-P01, A-P13 |
| envelope violation | envelope evaluated against the actual path | A-P02 |
| silent capability growth | capability delta → authority impact; explicit regrant required | A-P03, A-P16 |
| memory laundering / amplification | authority ceiling; source-capped transforms | A-P04 |
| revoked-authority resurrection | revoked memory cannot re-enter; REVOKED requires fresh authorization | A-P05, A-P18, A-P19 |
| world-model hallucination | world-state class bounds authority; simulation cannot authorize | A-P06 |
| delegation escalation | delegation-depth and scope checks | A-P07 |
| weak renewal | independent-evidence renewal; agent cannot renew | A-P08, A-P14 |
| verifier disagreement / compromise | structural independence; disagreement never allows; mutable-state verifiers excluded | A-P09, A-P20 |
| correlated/fake witnesses | evidence independence graph | A-P10 |
| salami / composition attack | path composition invariance | A-P11 |
| behavioral drift | drift → authority action | A-P12 |
| certificate forgery | clean-room recompute + pinned signer | A-P15 |
| environment change / TOCTOU | material-change triggers | A-P17 |

## Fail-closed posture

UNKNOWN, ERROR, malformed input, an unreadable policy, a stage exception, an empty execution path, or a missing
trust anchor all result in DENY (or INDETERMINATE), never ALLOW. `GRANTS_AUTHORITY` is `False` on every ARGUS
object.

## Non-goals / open

- No hardware root of trust; physical adapters are **SIMULATED**.
- Same-project tests; **no third-party security review or penetration test**.
- The hosted stages bind the CAIN decision path, not a customer's downstream system.
- No SOC 2 / compliance certification; no financial settlement integration.
