{
 "assets": [
  {
   "asset_id": "BFT-IP-0001",
   "baseline_prior_art": [
    "leases (Chubby, Gray & Cheriton 1989), capability caching, OAuth token TTL, CT inclusion proofs"
   ],
   "cain_mechanism": "authority committed by quorum, enforced locally in ~0.2 ms, revoked locally without quorum, each use anchored later",
   "commercial_status": "UNVALIDATED",
   "design_around_status": "EASY",
   "evidence": [
    "GOV-BFT-06..09",
    "RT-BFT-01/03/05/06/10"
   ],
   "evidence_status": "TESTED (self-assessed)",
   "implementation_files": [
    "platform-gateway/governance_snapshot.py"
   ],
   "implementation_status": "IMPLEMENTED",
   "ip_status": "CANDIDATE (not a legal opinion)",
   "limits": "outage permit window up to the TTL (120 s default, 900 s max); revocation epoch is local to one gateway database, not quorum-ordered",
   "measurable": "fast-path latency ~0.17-0.22 ms (GOV-BFT-06), revocation-to-miss ~0.2 ms (GOV-BFT-08), outage window = TTL (GOV-BFT-07)",
   "name": "Quorum-committed authorization snapshots with local revocation epoch",
   "prior_art_status": "RELATED_PRIOR_ART (author recall; no database search)",
   "protection_recommendation": "TRADE_SECRET (implementation) + DEFENSIVE_PUBLICATION candidate",
   "reproduction_status": "REPRODUCED in-process; not independently reproduced",
   "runtime_path": "GovernanceControlPlane, authorize_fast_path, SnapshotStore",
   "score_class": "MATERIAL",
   "score_total": 25,
   "scores": {
    "bft_differentiation": 2,
    "commercial_utility": 3,
    "design_around_resistance": 1,
    "evidence": 3,
    "governance_integration": 4,
    "protocol_potential": 2,
    "reproduction_difficulty": 2,
    "safety_significance": 3,
    "switching_cost": 2,
    "technical_effect": 3
   },
   "technical_effect": "removes the per-call round; revocation independent of cluster liveness; outage permit window = TTL",
   "technical_problem": "a PBFT round per decision costs ~1-2 s on the live WAN cluster; governance needs sub-ms checks without giving up quorum-agreed authority or fast revocation",
   "tests": [
    "GOV-BFT-06..09",
    "RT-BFT-01/03/05/06/10"
   ],
   "what_breaks_if_removed": "every permit pays a round; under cluster outage every permit fails (no window); revocation would need a round",
   "why_ordinary_bft_insufficient": "ordinary SMR either orders every request (slow) or serves stale reads; it has no notion of revoking a cached authority locally"
  },
  {
   "asset_id": "BFT-IP-0002",
   "baseline_prior_art": [
    "transparency logs (CT, RFC 6962), notarisation, permissioned-ledger endorsement"
   ],
   "cain_mechanism": "a governance verdict cannot permit unless 2f+1 replicas committed its exact commitment AND the gateway itself verified the QC",
   "commercial_status": "UNVALIDATED",
   "design_around_status": "EASY",
   "evidence": [
    "GOV-BFT-01..05",
    "GOV-BFT-10"
   ],
   "evidence_status": "TESTED (self-assessed)",
   "implementation_files": [
    "platform-gateway/fabric_control_plane.py"
   ],
   "implementation_status": "IMPLEMENTED",
   "ip_status": "CANDIDATE (not a legal opinion)",
   "limits": "replicas do not re-evaluate governance (GOV-BFT-10): it protects the RECORD, not the DECISION; a compromised gateway can commit a wrong ALLOW",
   "measurable": "GOV-BFT-02/04: no-quorum and false-COMMITTED both deny; GOV-BFT-03: one tampered QC does not block a genuine one",
   "name": "Fail-closed consensus stage: permit requires a gateway-verified QC over the exact decision commitment",
   "prior_art_status": "RELATED_PRIOR_ART (author recall; no database search)",
   "protection_recommendation": "OPEN_PROTOCOL (commitment + QC format) / TRADE_SECRET (pipeline)",
   "reproduction_status": "REPRODUCED in-process; not independently reproduced",
   "runtime_path": "TrustFabricControlPlane._consensus_stage; cain_mr_client.order_op/verify_commit",
   "score_class": "MATERIAL",
   "score_total": 25,
   "scores": {
    "bft_differentiation": 2,
    "commercial_utility": 2,
    "design_around_resistance": 1,
    "evidence": 4,
    "governance_integration": 4,
    "protocol_potential": 2,
    "reproduction_difficulty": 2,
    "safety_significance": 3,
    "switching_cost": 2,
    "technical_effect": 3
   },
   "technical_effect": "no quorum -> no permit (fail closed); tamper-evident, quorum-signed record of every permit",
   "technical_problem": "an authorization decision should be non-repudiable and unalterable after the fact, and must not succeed on a replica's word",
   "tests": [
    "GOV-BFT-01..05",
    "GOV-BFT-10"
   ],
   "what_breaks_if_removed": "a lying replica could produce 'COMMITTED'; decisions could be rewritten after the fact",
   "why_ordinary_bft_insufficient": "SMR clients usually trust f+1 matching replies; CAIN verifies one 2f+1 certificate against pinned membership and the exact digest"
  },
  {
   "asset_id": "BFT-IP-0005",
   "baseline_prior_art": [
    "signed audit records"
   ],
   "cain_mechanism": "states what consensus did NOT evaluate",
   "commercial_status": "UNVALIDATED",
   "design_around_status": "EASY",
   "evidence": [
    "tests/test_cain42_pbft_authorization.py"
   ],
   "evidence_status": "TESTED (self-assessed)",
   "implementation_files": [
    "platform-gateway/cain_pbft_engine_33.py"
   ],
   "implementation_status": "IMPLEMENTED",
   "ip_status": "CANDIDATE (not a legal opinion)",
   "limits": "verifiers are same-organisation; no third party has run them on record",
   "measurable": "public verifier tests 11 pass; claims registry downgrades liveness claims on stale proofs (e24781a9)",
   "name": "Evidence posture: proof objects that state what consensus did NOT evaluate + public zero-CAIN verifier + signed hourly proofs",
   "prior_art_status": "RELATED_PRIOR_ART (author recall; no database search)",
   "protection_recommendation": "OPEN_PROTOCOL (verifier + formats)",
   "reproduction_status": "REPRODUCED in-process; not independently reproduced",
   "runtime_path": "AuthorizationProofObject",
   "score_class": "MATERIAL",
   "score_total": 23,
   "scores": {
    "bft_differentiation": 2,
    "commercial_utility": 2,
    "design_around_resistance": 1,
    "evidence": 4,
    "governance_integration": 3,
    "protocol_potential": 3,
    "reproduction_difficulty": 2,
    "safety_significance": 2,
    "switching_cost": 2,
    "technical_effect": 2
   },
   "technical_effect": "evidence cannot overstate what the quorum checked",
   "technical_problem": "evidence that overclaims (trust/risk 'HIGH' hardcoded until 2026-09-24) is worse than none",
   "tests": [
    "tests/test_cain42_pbft_authorization.py"
   ],
   "what_breaks_if_removed": "third parties must trust CAIN's word",
   "why_ordinary_bft_insufficient": "BFT says nothing about evidence semantics"
  },
  {
   "asset_id": "BFT-IP-0004",
   "baseline_prior_art": [
    "Zyzzyva (SOSP 2007), SBFT (DSN 2019), FaB Paxos"
   ],
   "cain_mechanism": "a vote-history rule; model-checked",
   "commercial_status": "UNVALIDATED",
   "design_around_status": "EASY",
   "evidence": [
    "tests/test_pbft_reference_model.py"
   ],
   "evidence_status": "TESTED (self-assessed)",
   "implementation_files": [
    "scripts/cain42_bft/pbft_reference_model.py"
   ],
   "implementation_status": "IMPLEMENTED",
   "ip_status": "CANDIDATE (not a legal opinion)",
   "limits": "only N=4 f=1, 3 views; not enabled anywhere",
   "measurable": "exhaustive N=4,f=1 model, 3 views; negative controls fail as expected",
   "name": "Model-checked vote-history fast path",
   "prior_art_status": "RELATED_PRIOR_ART (author recall; no database search)",
   "protection_recommendation": "DEFENSIVE_PUBLICATION / OPEN",
   "reproduction_status": "REPRODUCED in-process; not independently reproduced",
   "runtime_path": "check()",
   "score_class": "DEVELOPING",
   "score_total": 20,
   "scores": {
    "bft_differentiation": 2,
    "commercial_utility": 1,
    "design_around_resistance": 2,
    "evidence": 3,
    "governance_integration": 1,
    "protocol_potential": 2,
    "reproduction_difficulty": 3,
    "safety_significance": 3,
    "switching_cost": 1,
    "technical_effect": 2
   },
   "technical_effect": "one-round commits when all N vote; OFF by default and in production",
   "technical_problem": "one-round commit when all replicas vote",
   "tests": [
    "tests/test_pbft_reference_model.py"
   ],
   "what_breaks_if_removed": "nothing in production (OFF)",
   "why_ordinary_bft_insufficient": "naive fast paths are unsafe across view change (model shows naive_fast VIOLATED)"
  },
  {
   "asset_id": "BFT-IP-0003",
   "baseline_prior_art": [
    "asynchronous audit logging"
   ],
   "cain_mechanism": "safety-asymmetric latency rule",
   "commercial_status": "UNVALIDATED",
   "design_around_status": "EASY",
   "evidence": [
    "GOV-BFT-05"
   ],
   "evidence_status": "TESTED (self-assessed)",
   "implementation_files": [
    "platform-gateway/fabric_control_plane.py"
   ],
   "implementation_status": "IMPLEMENTED",
   "ip_status": "CANDIDATE (not a legal opinion)",
   "limits": "deferred orders can fail after 5 attempts (recorded as failed)",
   "measurable": "GOV-BFT-05",
   "name": "Safety-asymmetric consensus deferral (non-permits ordered after reply)",
   "prior_art_status": "RELATED_PRIOR_ART (author recall; no database search)",
   "protection_recommendation": "DEFENSIVE_PUBLICATION",
   "reproduction_status": "REPRODUCED in-process; not independently reproduced",
   "runtime_path": "CONSENSUS_DEFER_NONPERMIT, _order_deferred",
   "score_class": "DEVELOPING",
   "score_total": 18,
   "scores": {
    "bft_differentiation": 2,
    "commercial_utility": 2,
    "design_around_resistance": 1,
    "evidence": 3,
    "governance_integration": 3,
    "protocol_potential": 1,
    "reproduction_difficulty": 1,
    "safety_significance": 2,
    "switching_cost": 1,
    "technical_effect": 2
   },
   "technical_effect": "a deny costs no consensus round; a permit always does (or a committed snapshot)",
   "technical_problem": "denies paid the full round latency although they authorize nothing",
   "tests": [
    "GOV-BFT-05"
   ],
   "what_breaks_if_removed": "deny latency = permit latency",
   "why_ordinary_bft_insufficient": "ordering is symmetric in SMR"
  },
  {
   "asset_id": "BFT-IP-0007",
   "baseline_prior_art": [
    "batching + Merkle (CT, Bitcoin)"
   ],
   "cain_mechanism": "applied to governance decisions",
   "commercial_status": "UNVALIDATED",
   "design_around_status": "EASY",
   "evidence": [
    "tests/test_consensus_group_commit.py"
   ],
   "evidence_status": "TESTED (self-assessed)",
   "implementation_files": [
    "platform-gateway/cain_mr_client.py"
   ],
   "implementation_status": "IMPLEMENTED",
   "ip_status": "CANDIDATE (not a legal opinion)",
   "limits": "batch reveals a root and count only",
   "measurable": "tests/test_consensus_group_commit.py (31 pass)",
   "name": "Group commit with per-decision RFC 6962 inclusion proofs",
   "prior_art_status": "RELATED_PRIOR_ART (author recall; no database search)",
   "protection_recommendation": "OPEN",
   "reproduction_status": "REPRODUCED in-process; not independently reproduced",
   "runtime_path": "order_grouped, root_from_path",
   "score_class": "DEVELOPING",
   "score_total": 18,
   "scores": {
    "bft_differentiation": 1,
    "commercial_utility": 2,
    "design_around_resistance": 1,
    "evidence": 3,
    "governance_integration": 3,
    "protocol_potential": 2,
    "reproduction_difficulty": 1,
    "safety_significance": 1,
    "switching_cost": 1,
    "technical_effect": 3
   },
   "technical_effect": "many decisions per round, each verifiable",
   "technical_problem": "rounds queue at the primary under load",
   "tests": [
    "tests/test_consensus_group_commit.py"
   ],
   "what_breaks_if_removed": "1.7 decisions/s at c4 (measured 2026-10-03)",
   "why_ordinary_bft_insufficient": "batching hides individual requests from verifiers"
  },
  {
   "asset_id": "BFT-IP-0006",
   "baseline_prior_art": [
    "accountability (PeerReview, SOSP 2007), BFT reconfiguration"
   ],
   "cain_mechanism": "quarantine as an ordered op",
   "commercial_status": "UNVALIDATED",
   "design_around_status": "EASY",
   "evidence": [
    "BFT-TV-08",
    "RT-BFT-02"
   ],
   "evidence_status": "TESTED (self-assessed)",
   "implementation_files": [
    "platform-gateway/cain_pbft_engine_33.py"
   ],
   "implementation_status": "IMPLEMENTED",
   "ip_status": "CANDIDATE (not a legal opinion)",
   "limits": "no dynamic membership (BFT-TV-18: NOT_IMPLEMENTED)",
   "measurable": "BFT-TV-08, RT-BFT-02/14",
   "name": "Consensus-ordered quarantine + hash-chained Byzantine evidence",
   "prior_art_status": "RELATED_PRIOR_ART (author recall; no database search)",
   "protection_recommendation": "OPEN",
   "reproduction_status": "REPRODUCED in-process; not independently reproduced",
   "runtime_path": "ByzantineEvidenceLog, apply_operation('quarantine')",
   "score_class": "DEVELOPING",
   "score_total": 17,
   "scores": {
    "bft_differentiation": 1,
    "commercial_utility": 1,
    "design_around_resistance": 1,
    "evidence": 3,
    "governance_integration": 2,
    "protocol_potential": 1,
    "reproduction_difficulty": 2,
    "safety_significance": 3,
    "switching_cost": 1,
    "technical_effect": 2
   },
   "technical_effect": "equivocation becomes durable evidence; exclusion is itself agreed",
   "technical_problem": "excluding a Byzantine replica must itself be agreed and evidenced",
   "tests": [
    "BFT-TV-08",
    "RT-BFT-02"
   ],
   "what_breaks_if_removed": "framing/eviction disputes",
   "why_ordinary_bft_insufficient": "PBFT tolerates but does not evict"
  },
  {
   "asset_id": "BFT-IP-0008",
   "baseline_prior_art": [
    "composite/hybrid signatures (IETF LAMPS drafts)"
   ],
   "cain_mechanism": "applied to QCs; library opt-in",
   "commercial_status": "UNVALIDATED",
   "design_around_status": "EASY",
   "evidence": [
    "tests/test_cain42_pbft_hybrid_qc.py"
   ],
   "evidence_status": "TESTED (self-assessed)",
   "implementation_files": [
    "platform-gateway/cain_pbft_qc.py"
   ],
   "implementation_status": "IMPLEMENTED",
   "ip_status": "CANDIDATE (not a legal opinion)",
   "limits": "library only, opt-in",
   "measurable": "18 tests pass",
   "name": "Hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 quorum certificates",
   "prior_art_status": "RELATED_PRIOR_ART (author recall; no database search)",
   "protection_recommendation": "OPEN",
   "reproduction_status": "REPRODUCED in-process; not independently reproduced",
   "runtime_path": "hybrid QC",
   "score_class": "DEVELOPING",
   "score_total": 14,
   "scores": {
    "bft_differentiation": 1,
    "commercial_utility": 1,
    "design_around_resistance": 1,
    "evidence": 2,
    "governance_integration": 1,
    "protocol_potential": 2,
    "reproduction_difficulty": 2,
    "safety_significance": 2,
    "switching_cost": 1,
    "technical_effect": 1
   },
   "technical_effect": "PQ migration path for certificates",
   "technical_problem": "PQ migration of certificates",
   "tests": [
    "tests/test_cain42_pbft_hybrid_qc.py"
   ],
   "what_breaks_if_removed": "nothing deployed",
   "why_ordinary_bft_insufficient": "n/a"
  }
 ]
}
