{
  "baseline": {
    "blocked": 1,
    "cases": [
      {
        "case": "legit step",
        "executed": true,
        "expected_executed": true,
        "note": "",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": null
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "missing permit",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "PERMIT_MISSING"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "forged permit (body altered)",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "PERMIT_SIGNATURE_INVALID"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "permit signed by attacker key",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "PERMIT_SIGNATURE_INVALID"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "replayed permit",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "PERMIT_REPLAY"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "expired permit",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "PERMIT_EXPIRED"
      },
      {
        "case": "scope escalation: action outside scope",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "ACTION_NOT_IN_SCOPE"
      },
      {
        "case": "scope escalation: world outside scope",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "WORLD_NOT_IN_SCOPE"
      },
      {
        "case": "tool substitution at decision (shell)",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "TOOL_NOT_IN_SCOPE"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "permit for action 1 used for action 3",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "PERMIT_DOES_NOT_MATCH_REQUEST"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "memory record presented as permit",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "PERMIT_SIGNATURE_INVALID"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "pre-issued permit after REVOKE",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "AGENT_REVOKED_AT_RESOURCE"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "pre-issued permit after KILL",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "KILL_SWITCH_ENGAGED_AT_RESOURCE"
      },
      {
        "case": "pre-issued permit after POLICY change",
        "executed": true,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "baseline has no policy version, so this executes there",
        "pass": false,
        "reason": null
      },
      {
        "case": "KILL while decision->resource link is cut (pre-issued permit)",
        "executed": true,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "baseline: the resource never hears the KILL; hardened: emergency key fences it directly",
        "pass": false,
        "reason": null
      },
      {
        "case": "REVOKE while decision->resource link is cut (pre-issued permit)",
        "executed": true,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "baseline: bounded only by the 5 s permit TTL; hardened: emergency key revokes directly at the resource",
        "pass": false,
        "reason": null
      },
      {
        "case": "emergency key cannot change policy (only KILL/REVOKE)",
        "executed": true,
        "expected_executed": true,
        "note": "the emergency key can stop things, not reconfigure them",
        "order": "ORDER_SIGNATURE_INVALID",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": null
      },
      {
        "case": "network partition: decision service down",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "DECISION_UNREACHABLE:URLError"
      },
      {
        "case": "compromised worker (stolen key) outside scope",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "WORLD_NOT_IN_SCOPE"
      },
      {
        "case": "compromised worker (stolen key) inside scope",
        "executed": true,
        "expected_executed": true,
        "note": "KNOWN LIMIT: a stolen key can act inside its own scope until revoked; scope and budget bound it",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": null
      },
      {
        "case": "forged emergency KILL by attacker (must not disable or hijack)",
        "executed": true,
        "expected_executed": true,
        "note": "the forged order is rejected and legitimate work continues",
        "order": "ORDER_SIGNATURE_INVALID",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": null
      },
      {
        "case": "KILL race: 40 concurrent steps, KILL mid-burst (resource ledger order)",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "fence = no effect recorded after the KILL order in the resource's own chained ledger",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "effects_after_kill_in_resource_ledger=0; executed_total=20/40"
      },
      {
        "case": "validator failure / BFT in the permit path",
        "executed": null,
        "expected_executed": null,
        "note": "BLOCKED: no consensus participates in this boundary today",
        "pass": null,
        "reason": "NOT_IN_PATH"
      }
    ],
    "failed": 3,
    "passed": 19
  },
  "generated_at": "2026-11-19T16:10:49Z",
  "hardened": {
    "blocked": 1,
    "cases": [
      {
        "case": "legit step",
        "executed": true,
        "expected_executed": true,
        "note": "",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": null
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "missing permit",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "PERMIT_MISSING"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "forged permit (body altered)",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "PERMIT_SIGNATURE_INVALID"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "permit signed by attacker key",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "PERMIT_SIGNATURE_INVALID"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "replayed permit",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "PERMIT_REPLAY"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "expired permit",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "PERMIT_EXPIRED"
      },
      {
        "case": "scope escalation: action outside scope",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "ACTION_NOT_IN_SCOPE"
      },
      {
        "case": "scope escalation: world outside scope",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "WORLD_NOT_IN_SCOPE"
      },
      {
        "case": "tool substitution at decision (shell)",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "TOOL_NOT_IN_SCOPE"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "permit for action 1 used for action 3",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "PERMIT_DOES_NOT_MATCH_REQUEST"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "memory record presented as permit",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "PERMIT_SIGNATURE_INVALID"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "pre-issued permit after REVOKE",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "AGENT_REVOKED_AT_RESOURCE"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "pre-issued permit after KILL",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "KILL_SWITCH_ENGAGED_AT_RESOURCE"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "pre-issued permit after POLICY change",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "baseline has no policy version, so this executes there",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "PERMIT_POLICY_EPOCH_STALE"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "KILL while decision->resource link is cut (pre-issued permit)",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "baseline: the resource never hears the KILL; hardened: emergency key fences it directly",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "KILL_SWITCH_ENGAGED_AT_RESOURCE"
      },
      {
        "authorized": false,
        "case": "REVOKE while decision->resource link is cut (pre-issued permit)",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "baseline: bounded only by the 5 s permit TTL; hardened: emergency key revokes directly at the resource",
        "ok": false,
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "AGENT_REVOKED_AT_RESOURCE"
      },
      {
        "case": "emergency key cannot change policy (only KILL/REVOKE)",
        "executed": true,
        "expected_executed": true,
        "note": "the emergency key can stop things, not reconfigure them",
        "order": "ORDER_SIGNATURE_INVALID",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": null
      },
      {
        "case": "network partition: decision service down",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "DECISION_UNREACHABLE:URLError"
      },
      {
        "case": "compromised worker (stolen key) outside scope",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "WORLD_NOT_IN_SCOPE"
      },
      {
        "case": "compromised worker (stolen key) inside scope",
        "executed": true,
        "expected_executed": true,
        "note": "KNOWN LIMIT: a stolen key can act inside its own scope until revoked; scope and budget bound it",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": null
      },
      {
        "case": "forged emergency KILL by attacker (must not disable or hijack)",
        "executed": true,
        "expected_executed": true,
        "note": "the forged order is rejected and legitimate work continues",
        "order": "ORDER_SIGNATURE_INVALID",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": null
      },
      {
        "case": "KILL race: 40 concurrent steps, KILL mid-burst (resource ledger order)",
        "executed": false,
        "expected_executed": false,
        "note": "fence = no effect recorded after the KILL order in the resource's own chained ledger",
        "pass": true,
        "reason": "effects_after_kill_in_resource_ledger=0; executed_total=20/40"
      },
      {
        "case": "validator failure / BFT in the permit path",
        "executed": null,
        "expected_executed": null,
        "note": "BLOCKED: no consensus participates in this boundary today",
        "pass": null,
        "reason": "NOT_IN_PATH"
      }
    ],
    "failed": 0,
    "passed": 22
  },
  "path": "LOOPBACK: decision service and resource server are separate OS processes on one host; not separate failure domains and not the production MCPGate (cain/mcp_proxy.py)",
  "permit_ttl_s": 5.0,
  "schema": "cain.e110.governance.results.v1"
}