# CAIN-42 — Master Security Model (E20 session scope)

**Law:** only the canonical authorization boundary authorizes protected execution.

## Adversarial probes executed this session (E20 primitives)

Source: `tools/e20/e20_contract.py security` → `artifacts/e20/E20_SECURITY_RESULTS.json`

| Probe | Expected | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Grant authority-bearing state without authorization | refuse | PASS |
| Delegate scope larger than parent | refuse | PASS |
| Capability scope larger than minting authority | refuse | PASS |
| Promote uncertain evidence to certain without verification | refuse | PASS |
| Cross-tenant access without explicit sharing grant | refuse | PASS |
| Simulation claiming authority | false | PASS |
| Reputation claiming authority | false | PASS |

## What is NOT covered here

- The full product-level corpus (identity/memory/policy/consensus/tool/evidence attacks) is reported
  by the prior Frontier-20 forensic campaign (`FRONTIER_20_SECURITY_REPORT.md`); it was **not re-run**.
- No chaos, DoS, supply-chain, or consensus-equivocation campaign was executed this session.
- No independent penetration test.

## Release gate

Per the directive, release requires **zero** known critical bypasses. This session found none in the
E20 primitives. That is an honest statement about a small surface, not a system-wide guarantee.
