# CAIN-42 E21 — Byzantine State Report

Source: `cain/e21/byzantine.py` · Evidence: `artifacts/e21/E21_BYZANTINE_RESULTS.json` (16/16 caught).

| Scenario | Expected | Caught |
|---|---|---|
| forged_state_root | replay rejects unreproducible root | ✅ |
| valid_signature_invalid_transition | cert valid, governance refuses | ✅ |
| forged_quorum_certificate | wrong-key signatures rejected | ✅ |
| insufficient_quorum | below-threshold rejected | ✅ |
| equivocation_detected | same (epoch,view,seq), different roots | ✅ |
| rollback_bypass_authorization | rollback needs its own auth | ✅ |
| stale_state_injection | parent mismatch rejected | ✅ |
| future_state_injection | future-dated rejected | ✅ |
| replayed_transition | nonce reuse rejected | ✅ |
| altered_transition_ordering | out-of-order parent binding fails | ✅ |
| malicious_checkpoint | checkpoint root must match replay | ✅ |
| corrupted_snapshot_detected | divergence at earliest index | ✅ |
| malicious_state_transfer | peer witness rejected | ✅ |
| conflicting_authorization_epoch | epoch mismatch rejected | ✅ |
| certificate_over_wrong_state | signatures valid but don't commit to state | ✅ |
| consensus_eligible_but_invalid | consensus eligibility rejects invalid transition | ✅ |

## Scope limitation
The adversary model is **in-process**: keys are generated in the process, and transport, network
partitions, equivocating leaders and multi-host recovery are not exercised. This is state-level
Byzantine reasoning, not a multi-host consensus campaign.
