{
 "defects_in_new_e10_code_caught_by_its_tests": [
  "agent_bom aliased the system BOM (one assessment's mutation polluted the next)",
  "E10 routes resolved request models through another module's globals (FastAPI 422 on every POST)",
  "docstring over-claimed that editing an already-verified log entry is detected by this process (it is only by a fresh process; corrected)"
 ],
 "full_suite_failures": [
  "tests/test_external_trust.py::test_e11_and_e12_documents_pass_the_claim_guard (fixed in 7a2ce44, 65/65 after)",
  "tests/test_public_sdk_is_thin.py::test_sdk_imports_only_stdlib_itself_and_optional_langchain (pre-existing; SDK _ed25519.py imports cryptography; owner decision)",
  "tests/test_public_sdk_is_thin.py::test_sdk_is_small (pre-existing; SDK 4,301 lines vs 2,000 limit)"
 ],
 "security_defects_found_in_existing_code": [
  {
   "fixed": "cain_store_integrity: rows checked against the HMAC transition chain and signed receipts at invoke/authorize/activate/E8 binding",
   "id": "E10F-01",
   "regression_tests": [
    "test_revoked_contract_resurrected_is_denied_with_a_receipt",
    "test_exhausted_contract_given_uses_back_is_denied"
   ],
   "severity": "CRITICAL",
   "what": "a SQLite edit setting a REVOKED/CONSUMED contract back to ACTIVE (or restoring its uses) was obeyed by decide(): ALLOW"
  },
  {
   "fixed": "RIG rows checked against the HMAC audit chain in safe_authority_snapshot (-> AUTHORITY_UNAVAILABLE)",
   "id": "E10F-02",
   "regression_tests": [
    "test_rig_row_edits_make_authority_unavailable",
    "test_revoked_agent_unrevoked_in_store_stays_revoked"
   ],
   "severity": "HIGH",
   "what": "RIG rows (scopes, actions, parent, runtime digest, status) were trusted as stored; widening scopes in SQLite let new contracts authorize against the widened scope, and un-revoking a row restored authority"
  },
  {
   "fixed": "logged from 2026-10-04; earlier agents are KEY_UNATTESTED (76 live) and are refused only in PROTECTED/HIGH_ASSURANCE",
   "id": "E10F-03",
   "severity": "MEDIUM",
   "what": "RIG REGISTER audit events did not record the public key, so a key swapped in the row was invisible to the log"
  },
  {
   "fixed": "E10 code digests cover all 13 components; E7 coverage of the engines is being added by its owner",
   "id": "E10F-04",
   "severity": "MEDIUM",
   "what": "E7 proofs cover 2 of 7 decision/execution components; a change to the forecast gate, quorum, key ring or product engines left E7 VALID"
  }
 ],
 "suite_failures": []
}
