# Deployment architecture (Evolution 14)

```
client ──signed──▶ coordinator ──▶ policy  (signs ALLOW/DENY bound to the action digest, policy version, expiry)
                        │
                        ├──▶ state   (hash-chained step log; checks every signature itself)
                        ├──▶ gate    (re-verifies the decision + live revocation at policy; executes once; signs receipt)
                        ├──▶ evidence (RFC 6962 transparency log)
                        └──▶ witness-0..3 (accept growth only with a consistency proof; threshold 3)
auditor ──signed, read-only ACL──▶ ledger pages, state, checkpoints  ──▶ export ──▶ cain-launchpad-verify (no CAIN imports)
```

- Each service is a separate OS process with its own Ed25519 key, a 0700 state directory, a socket, a per-path ACL by
  caller role, a 768 MB address-space limit, 512 file descriptors, no core dumps and a minimal environment.
- Requests are signed over method, path, body hash, caller, audience, nonce and timestamp. They must be fresh
  (60 s) and the nonce may be used once (durable replay cache). Responses are signed by the pinned responder key.
- The coordinator holds no authority. It only carries signed objects. Idempotency key = H(tenant, chain, step). The gate
  is called only after DISPATCHED is durably recorded. A lost answer becomes OUTCOME_UNKNOWN and is resolved from
  the gate's signed ledger, never assumed.
- Retries: only when no response was read, always with a fresh nonce, bounded with backoff. Timeouts are bounded
  everywhere.
- What this is NOT: separate machines, accounts, administrators or organizations. All processes share one kernel and
  one root user. Traffic is loopback HTTP: signed, not encrypted (TLS is required before crossing hosts, U14-08).
- Releases: `cain.launchpad.release` → python-tuf repository → `update.py install` (TUF + release policy) →
  `releases/<v>` + atomic `current` symlink → `deploy start --code-root <state>/current`.
