# Evolution 81 — Verification Report

## Tools

1. In-process `verify_bundle_dir` (project code) — `ok=True`.
2. **Standalone** `scripts/evolution81/verify_e81_offline.py` — imports no CAIN code; only stdlib
   and `cryptography`. `ok=True`.

| check | result |
|---|---|
| checkpoint_chain | True |
| completed_missions_have_all_tasks_done | True |
| effects_match_done_tasks | True |
| effects_unique | True |
| event_chain | True |
| event_count_matches_manifest | True |
| event_required_fields | True |
| event_signatures | True |
| file_hashes | True |
| files_present | True |
| manifest_counts_match | True |
| manifest_present | True |
| manifest_signature | True |
| merkle_root | True |
| mission_state_present | True |
| no_unlisted_files | True |
| signer_matches_pinned_key | True |
| task_idem_matches_effect | True |

## Second, independent implementation (Session B)

A separate session in this project wrote `verification/e81_independent/verify.py` without reading
or importing the E81 verifier. Its result on the same bundle: **ok = `True`**,
27 checks, failures `[]`; it independently
recomputed the same Merkle root (`merkle_matches = True`).

It raised these warnings, which are accepted rather than argued away:

- manifest.json is structurally outside its own file list and is therefore only self-authenticated by its embedded signature
- all events were signed by a single key that is also the manifest signing key; proposer and verifier are not cryptographically separated
- the signer public key is self-declared inside the manifest and is not pinned out of band, so the signature proves internal consistency only
- duplicate event actions in the evidence chain: ['MISSION_AUTHORIZED'] (the chain contains repeated state transitions rather than one timeline)
- bundle verdict is COMPLETED_WITH_UNVERIFIED_ITEMS: the producer itself did not claim full completion

This raises the assurance level from "one project verifier" to "two independent implementations
agree", but it is **still not third-party verification**: the key is not pinned out of band and
there is no external witness. G28 stays PARTIAL.

## Bundle

- Merkle root: `d744ab90f9e6141c37097a0b8c4863ffe9f56cead46be786557de80724b4faa8`
- Files: 8, events: 6, tasks: 6,
  effects: 6
- Signer fingerprint: `152231774fc0d4b5568a90615c281d26`
- Evidence class: `LOCAL`
- Second host: `True` — `second host in the same administrative domain; not an independent witness`

## Independence — stated precisely

The verifier is a separate tool, but it was written in this project by the same session. The key is
self-generated and its fingerprint has not been published out of band. There is no transparency-log
entry and no independent witness. Therefore:

- **NOT** "independently verified".
- **NOT** third-party audited.
- The second-host check is same-administrative-domain replication, not independence.

G28 and G29 are **PARTIAL** for exactly this reason.
