{
  "schema": "CAIN42/EVOLUTION7/PRODUCT-MAPPING/v1",
  "note": "Evolution 7 capabilities mapped onto EXISTING CAIN-42 product families. These are capability candidates, NOT new products; no duplicate product entries were created. Each row states the buyer, deliverable, dependencies, maturity, demonstration, outcome, and a pricing hypothesis. Only implemented+tested capabilities are marked; the rest are labelled experimental.",
  "rule": "Do not add a catalog entry unless there is a distinct buyer and a repeatable customer demonstration. Nothing here is regulatory compliance or certification.",
  "capabilities": [
    {
      "id": "E7-CAP-01",
      "name": "Canonical Action Identity",
      "maps_to_existing_family": "CAIN Guard / CAIN Kernel (action identity)",
      "buyer": "platform-security / AI-platform teams shipping agents that call tools",
      "deliverable": "A stable canonical digest for every proposed action (RFC 8785 JCS + documented equivalence rules + fail-closed normalization) that can be bound into policy, approval and evidence.",
      "dependencies": ["cain45.canon (Ed25519 signing)", "cain/action_commit/canonical.py"],
      "maturity": "IMPLEMENTED + TESTED (properties P301/P341-P343 analog, 10 equivalence rules)",
      "repeatable_demonstration": "Hash two look-alike actions and show a materially different action yields a different digest; show a homoglyph identity and a duplicate-key payload are refused.",
      "measurable_outcome": "Deny-by-construction of action substitution / TOCTOU drift at the authorization boundary.",
      "pricing_hypothesis": "Included in CAIN Guard Pro tier (per-seat) or usage-metered per governed action.",
      "overlap_checked": "PCA arguments digest (E1) covers a hashed argument set; E7 adds multi-surface canonicalization and explicit equivalence rules."
    },
    {
      "id": "E7-CAP-02",
      "name": "Deterministic Runtime Contract Engine",
      "maps_to_existing_family": "CAIN Guard / Verify (policy)",
      "buyer": "GRC / platform-security owners who must answer 'which agent may do what, under which policy version'",
      "deliverable": "Versioned policy set with total default-DENY evaluation and a bounded analyser (contradiction, shadowing, missing default-deny, tenant-crossing).",
      "dependencies": ["cain/action_commit/policy.py"],
      "maturity": "IMPLEMENTED + TESTED (P349, P352, P353); NOT FORGE-grade (no recursion, no correctness theorem)",
      "repeatable_demonstration": "Show a contradictory policy and a weak default-deny are flagged; show a cross-tenant action is denied.",
      "measurable_outcome": "Deterministic authorization decision with a machine-readable reason and a policy digest to commit to.",
      "pricing_hypothesis": "CAIN Guard enterprise policy-pack pricing.",
      "overlap_checked": "Existing policy compiler/Rego packs; E7 adds a total default-deny evaluator committed by digest."
    },
    {
      "id": "E7-CAP-03",
      "name": "Action-Commit Reference Monitor",
      "maps_to_existing_family": "MCPGate (enforcement) + CAIN Guard",
      "buyer": "platform teams that must prove enforcement, not logging",
      "deliverable": "Mandatory commit path binding the exact action to a single-use authorization, revalidated immediately before the effect; the executor is not invoked on denial.",
      "dependencies": ["cain/action_commit/reference_monitor.py", "cain.mcp_proxy (enforcement surface)"],
      "maturity": "IMPLEMENTED + TESTED (real experiment: executor not invoked on mutation; clean-room verified)",
      "repeatable_demonstration": "Mutate the action between authorization and execution; show DENY and that the effect function was never called.",
      "measurable_outcome": "Enforcement proof (not a log line) at the MCP boundary.",
      "pricing_hypothesis": "MCPGate boundary appliance / metered guarded actions.",
      "overlap_checked": "cain.mcp_proxy already gates tool calls; E7 adds canonical binding + TOCTOU revalidation + single-use authorization.",
      "known_limit": "Direct-backend bypass not controlled; only the MCP surface enforces."
    },
    {
      "id": "E7-CAP-04",
      "name": "Verified Execution Receipts",
      "maps_to_existing_family": "CAIN Verify / CAIN Proof",
      "buyer": "audit / compliance teams that need evidence an effect actually occurred",
      "deliverable": "Signed receipt bound to action digest + authorization with explicit effect states; EFFECT_VERIFIED requires an independent observation; contradiction/timeout/duplicate are reconciled, never assumed.",
      "dependencies": ["cain/action_commit/receipt.py", "cain-action-commit-verify"],
      "maturity": "IMPLEMENTED + TESTED (P351, experiment)",
      "repeatable_demonstration": "Claim success without an observation -> EFFECT_UNVERIFIED; contradict it -> EFFECT_CONTRADICTED.",
      "measurable_outcome": "No 'verified effect' can be claimed without external evidence.",
      "pricing_hypothesis": "CAIN Verify evidence-pack pricing.",
      "overlap_checked": "Proof-carrying actions exist; E7 adds explicit effect reconciliation and a receipt-bound clean-room check."
    },
    {
      "id": "E7-CAP-05",
      "name": "Approval-Bound Execution",
      "maps_to_existing_family": "CAIN Guard (approvals)",
      "buyer": "security/change-management teams requiring human sign-off for sensitive actions",
      "deliverable": "Approval committed to the exact action digest/tenant/scope/policy version/expiry; cannot transfer to a modified action.",
      "dependencies": ["cain/action_commit/approval.py"],
      "maturity": "IMPLEMENTED + TESTED (P346, approval_laundering, approval_replay)",
      "repeatable_demonstration": "Issue an approval for action A; attempt to satisfy an obligation for action A' -> APPROVAL_ACTION_MISMATCH / DENY.",
      "measurable_outcome": "No approval laundering or replay into a different action.",
      "pricing_hypothesis": "Included in Guard enterprise.",
      "overlap_checked": "Human-Approval object exists; E7 binds it to the canonical action digest."
    }
  ],
  "experimental_not_priced": [
    {"name": "Trajectory cumulative-risk hash-chain", "status": "IMPLEMENTED + TESTED (lab); no customer demonstration yet"},
    {"name": "Cross-framework adapter contract", "status": "PARTIAL; only MCP is an ENFORCEMENT adapter; others are OBSERVER"},
    {"name": "Restriction-only hosted stages (default_stages_v29)", "status": "LIVE (RESTRICTION_ONLY), not enabled by default"}
  ],
  "customer_journey": [
    "1. Integrate the MCP adapter so all tool calls route through cain.mcp_proxy.",
    "2. Author a versioned policy set; run DeterministicPolicyEngine.analyze and fix findings.",
    "3. Bind approvals to the exact canonical action for sensitive operations.",
    "4. Deploy the restriction-only stages; observe ALLOW/ABSTAIN/DENY decisions on real traffic.",
    "5. Export receipts + clean-room-verify bundles for audit.",
    "6. Only after a customer demonstration, promote to a priced product entry."
  ],
  "honesty": "No customers for this capability; no regulatory compliance or certification is claimed; the smallest credible wedge is evidence-gated action authorization for MCP-based agent deployments."
}
