---------------------------- MODULE CAINPBFTCommitSafety ---------------------------- (***************************************************************************) (* Bounded model of the CAIN-42 PBFT commit and view-change rules for ONE *) (* sequence number, N = 4 members, f = 1 Byzantine, quorum Q = 3, views 0 *) (* and 1, two candidate values. *) (* *) (* It models the rules as implemented after the 2026-09-23 fix in *) (* platform-gateway/cain_pbft_engine_33.py: *) (* - an honest member PREPAREs only its view's leader proposal; *) (* - it is PREPARED once a certificate exists (leader proposal + Q *) (* distinct PREPARE signers), its own or adopted from a COMMIT; *) (* - it signs COMMIT only when PREPARED (_become_prepared); *) (* - it executes only when PREPARED and Q distinct COMMIT signers exist *) (* for the same (view, value) (_try_commit_local); *) (* - on view change it reports its prepared certificates; the new *) (* primary re-proposes the value of the highest-view certificate *) (* reported in a quorum of VIEW_CHANGEs, else any value (null). *) (* A Byzantine member signs anything, for any view and value, at any time; *) (* it cannot forge an honest signature, so a certificate exists only when *) (* enough real signatures exist. *) (* *) (* OldRule = TRUE models the pre-fix rule "a verified prepared certificate *) (* is enough to execute" (OMEGA-03). IgnoreReports = TRUE models a new *) (* primary that does not honour reported certificates. Both are mutants *) (* that MUST violate Agreement, or a pass means nothing. *) (* *) (* Scope: a bounded MODEL, not the Python code. One sequence, two views. *) (***************************************************************************) EXTENDS FiniteSets, Naturals CONSTANTS Byz, OldRule, IgnoreReports Nodes == {"n1", "n2", "n3", "n4"} Honest == Nodes \ Byz Views == {0, 1} Values == {"X", "Y"} None == "none" Q == 3 Primary(v) == IF v = 0 THEN "n1" ELSE "n2" ASSUME Byz \subseteq Nodes /\ Cardinality(Byz) <= 1 /\ Primary(1) \notin Byz VARIABLES view, pp, prep, pcert, com, exec, vcRep, nvVal vars == <> Init == /\ view = [n \in Nodes |-> 0] /\ pp = [n \in Nodes |-> [v \in Views |-> None]] /\ prep = [n \in Nodes |-> [v \in Views |-> None]] /\ pcert = [n \in Nodes |-> [v \in Views |-> None]] /\ com = [n \in Nodes |-> [v \in Views |-> None]] /\ exec = [n \in Nodes |-> None] /\ vcRep = [n \in Nodes |-> None] \* None = no VIEW_CHANGE sent yet /\ nvVal = None \* The leader of v signed a proposal for val. LeaderSigned(v, val) == \/ Primary(v) \in Byz \/ pp[Primary(v)][v] = val \* A prepared certificate for (v, val) can be assembled from real signatures. CertExists(v, val) == /\ LeaderSigned(v, val) /\ Cardinality({s \in Honest : prep[s][v] = val} \cup Byz) >= Q CommitQuorum(v, val) == Cardinality({s \in Honest : com[s][v] = val} \cup Byz) >= Q \* An honest member accepts the leader's proposal of its current view. PrePrepare(n, v, val) == /\ n \in Honest /\ view[n] = v /\ pp[n][v] = None /\ IF Primary(v) \in Byz THEN TRUE \* Byzantine leader: any value, per member ELSE IF v = 0 THEN (n = Primary(0) \/ pp[Primary(0)][0] = val) ELSE nvVal = val \* view 1: the NEW_VIEW proposal /\ pp' = [pp EXCEPT ![n][v] = val] /\ UNCHANGED <> Prepare(n, v) == /\ n \in Honest /\ view[n] = v /\ pp[n][v] # None /\ prep[n][v] = None /\ prep' = [prep EXCEPT ![n][v] = pp[n][v]] /\ UNCHANGED <> BecomePrepared(n, v, val) == /\ n \in Honest /\ view[n] = v /\ pcert[n][v] = None /\ CertExists(v, val) /\ pcert' = [pcert EXCEPT ![n][v] = val] /\ UNCHANGED <> Commit(n, v) == /\ n \in Honest /\ view[n] = v /\ pcert[n][v] # None /\ com[n][v] = None /\ com' = [com EXCEPT ![n][v] = pcert[n][v]] /\ UNCHANGED <> Execute(n, v, val) == /\ n \in Honest /\ exec[n] = None /\ IF OldRule THEN CertExists(v, val) ELSE pcert[n][v] = val /\ CommitQuorum(v, val) /\ exec' = [exec EXCEPT ![n] = val] /\ UNCHANGED <> \* An honest member leaves view 0, reporting its prepared certificate. ViewChange(n) == /\ n \in Honest /\ view[n] = 0 /\ view' = [view EXCEPT ![n] = 1] /\ vcRep' = [vcRep EXCEPT ![n] = pcert[n][0]] /\ UNCHANGED <> \* The (honest) primary of view 1 picks its proposal from a quorum S of \* VIEW_CHANGEs. A Byzantine member in S may report any certificate that \* really exists, or nothing. NewView(S, byzReport, val) == /\ nvVal = None /\ view[Primary(1)] = 1 /\ S \subseteq Nodes /\ Cardinality(S) >= Q /\ \A s \in S \cap Honest : vcRep[s] # None \/ view[s] = 1 /\ byzReport \in {None} \cup {x \in Values : CertExists(0, x)} /\ LET reported == {vcRep[s] : s \in S \cap Honest} \cup (IF S \cap Byz # {} THEN {byzReport} ELSE {}) certs == reported \ {None} IN IF certs # {} /\ ~IgnoreReports THEN val \in certs ELSE TRUE /\ nvVal' = val /\ UNCHANGED <> Next == \/ \E n \in Nodes, v \in Views, val \in Values : PrePrepare(n, v, val) \/ \E n \in Nodes, v \in Views : Prepare(n, v) \/ Commit(n, v) \/ \E n \in Nodes, v \in Views, val \in Values : BecomePrepared(n, v, val) \/ Execute(n, v, val) \/ \E n \in Nodes : ViewChange(n) \/ \E S \in SUBSET Nodes, b \in {None} \cup Values, val \in Values : NewView(S, b, val) Spec == Init /\ [][Next]_vars \* PROPERTY-001: no two honest members execute different values at one sequence. Agreement == \A a, b \in Honest : (exec[a] # None /\ exec[b] # None) => exec[a] = exec[b] \* An honest member never signs COMMIT for a value it is not prepared for (OMEGA-01). CommitOnlyWhenPrepared == \A n \in Honest, v \in Views : com[n][v] # None => com[n][v] = pcert[n][v] TypeOK == /\ view \in [Nodes -> Views] /\ exec \in [Nodes -> Values \cup {None}] /\ nvVal \in Values \cup {None} =============================================================================