# CAIN42 — Effect Security Model (Prompt 13)

## Trust boundaries

- The agent is untrusted to authorize; it may only propose.
- MCPGate enforces; the external system changes; CAIN observes and verifies.
- Evidence sources are untrusted individually; independence is computed, not assumed.

## Threats and controls

| Threat | Control | Property |
|---|---|---|
| replay / duplicate | idempotency key + nonce, single claim | E-P04, E-P14 |
| stale authorization/state | temporal validity, world-state comparison | E-P07, E-P10 |
| forged receipt | clean-room recompute of hashes/signature/binding | E-P09 |
| parameter/target mutation | EffectFingerprint comparison | E-P12 |
| false finalization | finalization requires verification | E-P03, E-P15 |
| blind retry | IN_DOUBT resolution, retry disabled | E-P05 |
| compensation escalation | recovery requires its own authority | E-P06, E-P13 |
| correlated witnesses | independence graph / quorum | E-P08 |
| delegated escalation | delegation depth budget | E-P11 |
| approval flooding | human oversight budget | tests |

## Non-goals / open

- No hardware attestation; physical adapters are SIMULATED.
- No financial settlement integration.
- The downstream customer execution is not yet bound to the decision (top blocker).
- Same-project tests; no third-party review.
