{
  "schema": "cain42.sovereign.evo01.threat_register.v1",
  "generated": "2026-10-12",
  "source_revision_start": "6cfa3b9e465a35b846311e53503aae509fd457d7",
  "compromise_levels_note": "A control protects only above the level it trusts: application-level checks do not survive process, container, kernel or hardware compromise of the gateway/proxy host.",
  "threats": [
    {
      "id": "T-S46-01",
      "title": "Forged or self-signed proof-carrying action accepted by the hosted proof stage",
      "assets": "hosted /mcp tool execution",
      "attacker_prereqs": "network access to /mcp; any Ed25519 key",
      "entry_point": "tools/call argument _cain_proof_action",
      "existing_controls": "signature check, PROVED status check",
      "observed_evidence": "repro H6 at 6cfa3b9e: unpinned stage ALLOWed an attacker-key proof",
      "coverage": {
        "prevent": "YES",
        "detect": "YES",
        "contain": "PARTIAL"
      },
      "impact": "authorization by any key holder (strict mode)",
      "required_test": "test_d06_*",
      "residual_risk": "pinned key theft (A2); stage not live (v27)",
      "release_implication": "NONE",
      "compromise_level": "application",
      "defects": [
        "D-S46-06"
      ],
      "status": "FIXED c0b6a64b"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-S46-02",
      "title": "Proof replay / single-use bypass on the hosted proof stage",
      "assets": "single-use authorization",
      "attacker_prereqs": "one valid proof (e.g. observed in transit or logs)",
      "entry_point": "_cain_proof_action reuse",
      "existing_controls": "NonceLedger (optional before)",
      "observed_evidence": "repro H1/H2: v28 builder passed nonces=None; empty nonce skipped the check",
      "coverage": {
        "prevent": "YES",
        "detect": "YES",
        "contain": "NO"
      },
      "impact": "unbounded reuse within validity",
      "required_test": "test_d01_*, test_d02_*, test_d07_concurrent_*",
      "residual_risk": "ledger is per process (T-S46-06)",
      "release_implication": "NONE",
      "compromise_level": "application",
      "defects": [
        "D-S46-01",
        "D-S46-02",
        "D-S46-07"
      ],
      "status": "FIXED c0b6a64b"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-S46-03",
      "title": "Unbound fields in a signed proof act as wildcards (arguments, principal, validity)",
      "assets": "parameter/principal binding",
      "attacker_prereqs": "a legitimately issued proof with an empty field",
      "entry_point": "_cain_proof_action",
      "existing_controls": "digest/agent/tenant comparisons skipped when empty",
      "observed_evidence": "repro H3/H4/H5 ALLOW at 6cfa3b9e",
      "coverage": {
        "prevent": "YES",
        "detect": "YES",
        "contain": "NO"
      },
      "impact": "any arguments / any caller / never expires",
      "required_test": "test_d03_*, test_d04_*, test_d05_*",
      "residual_risk": "caller identity on the hosted path is self-asserted (T-S46-05)",
      "release_implication": "NONE",
      "compromise_level": "application",
      "defects": [
        "D-S46-03",
        "D-S46-04",
        "D-S46-05"
      ],
      "status": "FIXED c0b6a64b"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-S46-04",
      "title": "Strict mode satisfied by an unrelated stage's ALLOW",
      "assets": "CAIN_STRICT_SOVEREIGN_PROOF guarantee",
      "attacker_prereqs": "none beyond /mcp access",
      "entry_point": "_cain_nonce argument (replay stage ALLOW)",
      "existing_controls": "strict mode = 'pipeline ALLOW'",
      "observed_evidence": "repro H8: strict mode + v27 + random _cain_nonce -> EXECUTED with no proof",
      "coverage": {
        "prevent": "YES",
        "detect": "YES",
        "contain": "NO"
      },
      "impact": "strict proof requirement void",
      "required_test": "test_d08_*",
      "residual_risk": "strict mode is off in production",
      "release_implication": "NONE",
      "compromise_level": "application",
      "defects": [
        "D-S46-08"
      ],
      "status": "FIXED c0b6a64b"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-S46-05",
      "title": "Hosted pipeline caller identity is self-asserted (_cain_agent / _cain_tenant arguments)",
      "assets": "principal binding on hosted /mcp",
      "attacker_prereqs": "API access",
      "entry_point": "tools/call arguments",
      "existing_controls": "proof agent/tenant must equal the asserted values",
      "observed_evidence": "HostedGovernancePipeline.evaluate reads agent/tenant from arguments",
      "coverage": {
        "prevent": "PARTIAL",
        "detect": "NO",
        "contain": "NO"
      },
      "impact": "a stolen proof can be presented by anyone who names its agent",
      "required_test": "bind agent/tenant to the authenticated API-key principal (Evo-2)",
      "residual_risk": "open",
      "release_implication": "OPEN_ITEM",
      "compromise_level": "application",
      "defects": [],
      "status": "OPEN"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-S46-06",
      "title": "Replay across processes or after a failed ledger write",
      "assets": "single-use permits",
      "attacker_prereqs": "valid permit + two gateway instances (blue/green) or disk failure",
      "entry_point": "NonceLedger loads its file once per process; consume() ignores OSError; proxy _CAPABILITY_NONCES is in-memory",
      "existing_controls": "per-process lock",
      "observed_evidence": "code inspection (cain/continuum/hosted_pipeline.py NonceLedger; cain/mcp_proxy.py _CAPABILITY_NONCES)",
      "coverage": {
        "prevent": "PARTIAL",
        "detect": "NO",
        "contain": "NO"
      },
      "impact": "one extra use per instance / after restart",
      "required_test": "two-process replay test (Evo-2)",
      "residual_risk": "open",
      "release_implication": "OPEN_ITEM",
      "compromise_level": "process",
      "defects": [],
      "status": "OPEN"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-S46-07",
      "title": "Contained (quarantined / kill-switched) agent executes via its own capability token",
      "assets": "containment guarantee",
      "attacker_prereqs": "a registered identity key (the agent's own)",
      "entry_point": "capability_token / _cain_capability argument at MCPGate",
      "existing_controls": "mid-flight poll and pre-release re-check (HTTP) only",
      "observed_evidence": "repro B/B2: DENIED without token, ALLOW with token; downstream tool hit 1x",
      "coverage": {
        "prevent": "YES",
        "detect": "YES",
        "contain": "YES"
      },
      "impact": "containment bypass with real downstream effect",
      "required_test": "test_d10_*",
      "residual_risk": "quarantine store must be readable/current (A7)",
      "release_implication": "NONE",
      "compromise_level": "application",
      "defects": [
        "D-S46-10"
      ],
      "status": "FIXED 3eff02c2"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-S46-08",
      "title": "Agent's own token overrides the operator allowlist (REQUIRE_APPROVAL -> ALLOW)",
      "assets": "operator policy / human approval",
      "attacker_prereqs": "identity registered with tool:X, tool:* or *",
      "entry_point": "capability_token at MCPGate",
      "existing_controls": "identity capability grant",
      "observed_evidence": "repro A: REQUIRE_APPROVAL without token, ALLOW with token; Z3 model SAT",
      "coverage": {
        "prevent": "NO",
        "detect": "NO",
        "contain": "NO"
      },
      "impact": "approval requirement not enforced for token holders",
      "required_test": "test_d11_* (strict xfail)",
      "residual_risk": "open: existing suites assert this precedence",
      "release_implication": "BLOCKER",
      "compromise_level": "application",
      "defects": [
        "D-S46-11"
      ],
      "status": "OPEN (owner decision)"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-S46-09",
      "title": "Library verifiers accept any key when the optional pin is omitted",
      "assets": "proof/permit verification libraries",
      "attacker_prereqs": "a future caller that omits the pin",
      "entry_point": "z3_solver_gate.verify_proof_action, attestation_bound_pca.py:147, swarm_protocol.py:157, cain_proof_carrying_action.ProofCarryingActionVerifier(trusted_issuer_keys=None)",
      "existing_controls": "none when unpinned",
      "observed_evidence": "code inspection; no production caller found",
      "coverage": {
        "prevent": "NO",
        "detect": "NO",
        "contain": "NO"
      },
      "impact": "latent I3 violation",
      "required_test": "make pins mandatory (Evo-2)",
      "residual_risk": "latent",
      "release_implication": "OPEN_ITEM",
      "compromise_level": "application",
      "defects": [
        "D-S46-12"
      ],
      "status": "OPEN"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-S46-10",
      "title": "Tests write live evidence ledgers",
      "assets": "integrity of production evidence",
      "attacker_prereqs": "none (hygiene)",
      "entry_point": "pytest",
      "existing_controls": "none",
      "observed_evidence": "live decisions ledger grew 1151 -> 1163 during a baseline run",
      "coverage": {
        "prevent": "PARTIAL",
        "detect": "YES",
        "contain": "NO"
      },
      "impact": "test rows mixed into production evidence",
      "required_test": "autouse redirect fixtures (added in the two affected files)",
      "residual_risk": "other suites may still default to live paths",
      "release_implication": "OPEN_ITEM",
      "compromise_level": "application",
      "defects": [
        "D-S46-09"
      ],
      "status": "FIXED for the 2 files, c0b6a64b"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-S17-01",
      "title": "Formal-proof API returns proved=True for inputs it cannot interpret",
      "assets": "integrity of /verifygate/* proof results and their evidence_sha256",
      "attacker_prereqs": "none (routes are public)",
      "entry_point": "POST /verifygate/prove-monotonicity | prove-memory-containment | prove-temporal-decay",
      "existing_controls": "pydantic range checks on decay numbers; Z3 timeout 10 s",
      "observed_evidence": "D-S17-01..04 reproduced on 6cfa3b9e; fixed 3537d76e; 106/106 post-fix",
      "coverage": {
        "prevent": "YES",
        "detect": "PARTIAL",
        "contain": "NO"
      },
      "impact": "a client treating proved=True as permission would accept an escalated or uninterpretable authority; no CAIN authorization path consumes these results (only the routes and tests call them)",
      "required_test": "tests/test_sovereign_e1_verifygate_fail_closed.py",
      "residual_risk": "results are unsigned; the model is a single-comparison encoding, so UNSAT means only that the stated numeric comparison cannot be violated with the given constants",
      "release_implication": "NONE",
      "compromise_level": "application",
      "source": "s17/findings.json"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-S17-02",
      "title": "Unauthenticated process spawn / resource exhaustion through the continuum verify route",
      "assets": "gateway host memory and CPU; gateway availability",
      "attacker_prereqs": "network access to any of the 3 domains",
      "entry_point": "POST /fabric/continuum/verify/run",
      "existing_controls": "worker takes an flock, so only one harness runs at a time (but every POST still starts an interpreter, and the harness can be kept running back-to-back)",
      "observed_evidence": "D-S17-05; fixed a098fa61; not deployed",
      "coverage": {
        "prevent": "YES",
        "detect": "NO",
        "contain": "PARTIAL"
      },
      "impact": "denial of service of the request-serving gateway",
      "required_test": "tests/test_sovereign_e1_continuum_run_operator_only.py",
      "residual_risk": "no rate limit on the operator path",
      "release_implication": "NONE",
      "compromise_level": "application",
      "source": "s17/findings.json"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-S17-03",
      "title": "Policy-service outage downgrades a remote DENY to a local ALLOW in the SDK guard",
      "assets": "authorization decisions for SDK-guarded functions",
      "attacker_prereqs": "ability to block or break the agent host's connection to the policy gateway (DNS, egress firewall, TLS failure), or a non-200 response",
      "entry_point": "cain.guard remote mode, cain/guard.py:477-485",
      "existing_controls": "local baseline is default-deny (allowlist only); fail_closed=True is honoured only when CAIN_ALLOW_OFFLINE_LOCAL is set to something other than 'true', and it defaults to 'true'",
      "observed_evidence": "source read; already published as GAP-04 (HIGH) in CAIN42_L5_REPOSITORY_AUDIT.md (2026-09-28), still open; FIXED 9672bdc1 (owner-approved default flip), 5 tests (2 fail on the old default)",
      "coverage": {
        "prevent": "YES",
        "detect": "PARTIAL",
        "contain": "NO"
      },
      "impact": "an action the remote policy denies, but that is on the developer's local allowlist, executes during an induced outage (violates I9 as stated: the offline policy is not separately authorized)",
      "required_test": "guard(remote) with a gateway that DENYs action X, then unreachable, with X on the local allowlist: expect DENY",
      "residual_risk": "operators who set CAIN_ALLOW_OFFLINE_LOCAL=true accept the fallback; installed SDKs keep the old default until upgraded",
      "release_implication": "NONE",
      "compromise_level": "application",
      "source": "s17/findings.json"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-S17-04",
      "title": "SDK guard accepts an unauthenticated ALLOW from whatever answers at the gateway URL",
      "assets": "authorization decisions for SDK-guarded functions",
      "attacker_prereqs": "control of the network path or the configured gateway URL (http:// is accepted)",
      "entry_point": "cain/guard.py:452-460 (response JSON 'decision' is trusted; 'signature' is copied, never verified)",
      "existing_controls": "TLS when the URL is https; API key sent to the gateway",
      "observed_evidence": "source read",
      "coverage": {
        "prevent": "NO",
        "detect": "NO",
        "contain": "NO"
      },
      "impact": "a spoofed gateway can authorize any action, and the ALLOW is then cached for the fast path",
      "required_test": "guard against a stub gateway returning an unsigned ALLOW: expect DENY once decision-signature pinning exists",
      "residual_risk": "full until decisions are signed and the SDK pins the decision key",
      "release_implication": "OPEN_ITEM",
      "compromise_level": "process",
      "source": "s17/findings.json"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-S17-05",
      "title": "Host enforcement on the hosted path is application-level only; the eBPF 'enforcement' program observes",
      "assets": "host files, network, processes reachable by tool execution",
      "attacker_prereqs": "a tool call that MCPGate allowed, or code running in the gateway process",
      "entry_point": "any allowed tool execution; direct subprocess/network use by an agent that does not route through MCPGate",
      "existing_controls": "MCPGate application checks; cain/ebpf_enforcer.py kprobe bpf_override_return (-EPERM before the syscall runs) exists for its own sandbox launcher; /frontier/kernel/sandbox-run disabled unless CAIN_KERNEL_SANDBOX_RUN_ENABLED=1; /fabric/openshell/execute-sandboxed operator-only",
      "observed_evidence": "cain-ebpf/cain_enforce.bpf.c is tracepoint-only and always returns 0 (D-S17-06); BPF LSM not in the active LSM list on this host (lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,apparmor,ima,evm); kprobe-override deny NOT re-executed in this evolution",
      "coverage": {
        "prevent": "PARTIAL",
        "detect": "PARTIAL",
        "contain": "PARTIAL"
      },
      "impact": "an agent that bypasses MCPGate (direct client, direct subprocess, direct socket) is not stopped by any kernel control on the hosted path",
      "required_test": "non-destructive kprobe-override deny test in an isolated VM; out of scope here",
      "residual_risk": "MCPGate does not mediate traffic that does not go through it; kernel compromise defeats all of these controls",
      "release_implication": "BLOCKER",
      "compromise_level": "kernel",
      "source": "s17/findings.json"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-S17-06",
      "title": "MCPGate decision evidence is not durable or request-bound",
      "assets": "after-the-fact reconstruction of what MCPGate allowed or denied",
      "attacker_prereqs": "none for loss; process restart loses in-memory state",
      "entry_point": "cain/mcp_proxy.py MCPToolCallEvaluation.evidence_digest",
      "existing_controls": "per-decision digests, mostly sha256 of the reason string",
      "observed_evidence": "source read (cain/mcp_proxy.py:260-601): no append-only ledger is written by the proxy itself",
      "coverage": {
        "prevent": "NO",
        "detect": "NO",
        "contain": "NO"
      },
      "impact": "two different requests denied for the same reason get the same evidence digest; no local chain to detect deletion",
      "required_test": "per-request evidence record bound to the action digest, chained and externally checkpointed (ihvrk/ledger is the candidate)",
      "residual_risk": "a local hash chain still does not stop a privileged writer from rewriting everything without an external checkpoint",
      "release_implication": "OPEN_ITEM",
      "compromise_level": "application",
      "source": "s17/findings.json"
    }
  ]
}