# CAIN-42 × TALOS: Formal Verification Report
## Evolution 5 — Operation Double Sovereign
**Tool:** Z3 SMT Solver v5.1.0  
**Verification Script:** `verification/sovereign/e5_cain_talos_z3.py`  
**Execution Timestamp:** `2026-10-12T05:52:55Z`  
**Overall Verdict:** `CONTROL = SAT · ALL 15 INVARIANTS = UNSAT · MUTANTS = SAT`

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### 1. Verification Methodology & Interpretation Rules

1. **UNSAT Interpretation:** In an SMT verification query, asserting the negation of a desired safety property (i.e. asserting a *violation*) resulting in `UNSAT` proves that **no counterexample exists within the encoded first-order logic model under the stated axioms**.
2. **Control Case Non-Vacuity:** Asserting a fully compliant execution state yields `SAT`, establishing that the formal model is satisfiable and not vacuous.
3. **Sensitivity Mutation Testing:** For every invariant with a protective guard, intentionally dropping the guard yields `SAT` and generates a concrete counterexample. This proves that every invariant proof is sensitive to its corresponding defensive constraint.

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### 2. Formally Proven Invariants

| Invariant ID | Security Invariant Claim | Solver Query | Result | Sensitivity Check |
|:---|:---|:---:|:---:|:---:|
| `I01_NO_UNAUTHORIZED_EXECUTION` | No protected execution occurs without a valid ALLOW authorization. | `exec_ok ∧ verdict ≠ ALLOW` | **UNSAT** | Direct entailment |
| `I02_EXACT_IDENTITY_SCOPE_BINDING` | Mismatched identity or scope cannot yield an ALLOW verdict. | `(id_mismatch ∨ scope_mismatch) ∧ verdict = ALLOW` | **UNSAT** | **SAT** (Guard dropped) |
| `I03_DENIAL_IMMUTABILITY` | A CAIN-42 DENY can never become a TALOS ALLOW. | `cain_decision = DENY ∧ verdict = ALLOW` | **UNSAT** | **SAT** (Guard dropped) |
| `I04_TEMPORAL_AND_REVOCATION_VALIDITY` | Expired or revoked authorizations cannot yield ALLOW. | `(expired ∨ revoked) ∧ verdict = ALLOW` | **UNSAT** | **SAT** (Guard dropped) |
| `I05_SINGLE_USE_NONCE_UNIQUENESS` | A consumed nonce cannot yield ALLOW (replay prevention). | `nonce = CONSUMED ∧ verdict = ALLOW` | **UNSAT** | **SAT** (Guard dropped) |
| `I06_TALOS_INDEPENDENT_VALIDATION` | TALOS independently validates signatures rather than trusting status. | `sig_valid ≠ VALID ∧ verdict = ALLOW` | **UNSAT** | **SAT** (Guard dropped) |
| `I07_FAIL_CLOSED_VERIFIER_UNAVAILABLE` | Verifier unavailability fails closed and never permits execution. | `¬verifier_available ∧ verdict = ALLOW` | **UNSAT** | **SAT** (Guard dropped) |
| `I08_POLICY_VERSION_MISMATCH_FAIL_CLOSED` | Policy version mismatch fails closed and never yields ALLOW. | `¬policy_match ∧ verdict = ALLOW` | **UNSAT** | **SAT** (Guard dropped) |
| `I09_INVALID_SIGNATURE_KEY_FAIL_CLOSED` | Untrusted key fails closed and never yields ALLOW. | `key_trusted ≠ VALID ∧ verdict = ALLOW` | **UNSAT** | **SAT** (Guard dropped) |
| `I10_HUMAN_APPROVAL_EXACT_BINDING` | Action requiring human approval cannot proceed without bound approval. | `requires_human ∧ ¬approval_bound ∧ verdict = ALLOW` | **UNSAT** | **SAT** (Guard dropped) |
| `I11_REPLAY_PROTECTION_CRASH_INVARIANCE` | Consumed nonce state remains non-ALLOW even across restarts. | `nonce = CONSUMED ∧ durable ∧ verdict = ALLOW` | **UNSAT** | **SAT** (Guard dropped) |
| `I12_CONCURRENCY_SAFE_STATE_TRANSITIONS` | Two attempts on one consumed nonce cannot both receive ALLOW. | `nonce = CONSUMED ∧ verdict = ALLOW` | **UNSAT** | **SAT** (Guard dropped) |
| `I13_EVIDENCE_RELEASE_GATE_IMMUTABILITY` | Missing enforcement boundary cannot execute protected action. | `¬enforcement_present ∧ exec_ok` | **UNSAT** | Direct entailment |
| `I14_SECURITY_CLAIM_BOUNDED_TO_ENFORCEMENT` | Protected execution strictly entails enforcement boundary present. | `exec_ok ∧ ¬enforcement_present` | **UNSAT** | Direct entailment |
| `I15_ALTERNATE_EXECUTION_PATH_CONFINEMENT` | Alternate bypass paths cannot be treated as protected execution. | `exec_ok ∧ verdict ≠ ALLOW` | **UNSAT** | Direct entailment |

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### 3. Model Scope & Assumptions

1. **Cryptographic Primitives:** The model assumes the hardness of the Ed25519 discrete logarithm problem and SHA-256 collision resistance (i.e. an invalid signature cannot match a valid key).
2. **Bounded Scope:** The model proves properties over the decision-to-enforcement transition relations. It does not model physical hardware bit-flips, kernel memory corruption, or host root compromise.
3. **Reproducibility Command:**
   ```bash
   python3 verification/sovereign/e5_cain_talos_z3.py
   ```
