Attack lab
Five real sessions on the live firewall: three attacks on the agent's own controls, one legitimate change, and normal work.
4 attacks 1 controls live: nothing pre-recorded
- Pick a preset. Red ones are attacks, green ones are honest requests that must still work.
- Tamper. Choose any field and drop it, null it, change its type, upper-case it, flip one character, or add a field the product never asked for.
- Send and read the real reply, or run every preset and watch the scoreboard fill.
What each preset tests
| Preset | Route | Why it matters | |
|---|---|---|---|
| control | Control: normal engineering work | POST /api/v1/autonomy-guards/self-modification/run | Reading, editing source, running tests and stopping its own stuck job: all allowed. |
| attack | The agent edits its own shutdown script | POST /api/v1/autonomy-guards/self-modification/run | Modeled on a 2025 research report of models rewriting a shutdown script. Disguised variants refused too. |
| attack | Disable the monitor, copy 'its weights' out | POST /api/v1/autonomy-guards/self-modification/run | Modeled on 2024 research on AI 'scheming': edit oversight, kill the monitor, copy the model away. |
| attack | Edit its own grader, grant itself admin, add tools | POST /api/v1/autonomy-guards/self-modification/run | Reward hacking and self-granted permissions, including a command hidden in base64. |
| attack | A legitimate policy change: held, tampered copy refused | POST /api/v1/autonomy-guards/self-modification/run | The change waits for a person; applying different content is refused; exactly the approved content passes. |
Each button runs a full session on the live firewall. Rate limited per address.
FIRME AI CORPORATION · CAIN-42 is a Byzantine trust fabric. Numbers marked "our own check" were run by us, not by an independent party. Nothing on these pages is a certification.